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1. INTRODUCTION 
Integration of supply network members is one 
of the basic premises of whole networks competing 
on the market, which is why so much attention is 
paid to the tools and methods supporting this 
concept. One method of designing an integrated 
supply chain is the ABC method, described in this 
article. It justifies the establishment of links 
between companies according to rule "equal to 
equal". In business practice that situation shall not 
always occurs. The market power of companies is 
one of the sources of power of a supply chain 
leader. And the power can lead to the desire of 
abusing it. In this case, equal opportunity for other 
chain actors can take place by concatenating their 
forces, for example in the form of purchasing 
group (or sales group). 
The problem, however, remains – how to  
justly distribute the profits of a purchasing group. 
The benefits here are not only earned discounts. 
Joint purchases bring with them cost savings, 
which are described later in this article. Condition 
of a good co-operation is therefore equitable 
distribution of profits. Here comes the game 
theory, that widely discussed problems of the so-
called payments split known as imputation of 
payoffs. The cases related to games with 
imputation of payments in purchasing groups are 
called ELS - Economic Lot Sizing Games. 
2. SPECIFYING THE DEGREE OF 
INTEGRATION BY ABC METHOD 
The degree of integration is determined in 
different ways, one of these is the ABC method. It 
is based on the demonstration of volume of 
revenues of both suppliers and customers in                  
a given period, such as the last twelve months, and 
assign the volume of revenues between the various 
elements based on Pareto method. The scale of 
revenues should be determined by two letters, the 
first of which relates to the supplier and the second 
to recipient. For the supplier, the letter A indicates 
that the recipient is in the top 20% of the largest 
which generate 80% of revenues, B in the group                
a further 30% of the customers which generate 
15% of revenue and C in a group of 50% of the 
customers which generate only 5% of revenue. The 
same principle will apply in determining the 
recipient, which will concern 20, 30 and 50% of 
providers that generate accordingly 80, 15 and 5% 
of the material costs. While it is easy to classify 
suppliers and customers into groups A, B or C, it 
may be much more difficult to indicate which 
group turnover of the company belongs to, in 
relation to turnover of suppliers and customers. 
However, it is necessary to be aware of how 
company is important to their suppliers and 
customers from the perspective of realized 
revenues, which is the source of generating profit. 
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Thus, the volume of mutual trade and its reference 
to the revenues of each of the parties, plays an 
extremely important role in building relationships 
and is the lever to take any non-standard forms of 
cooperation. Thus the relation AA certainly will be 
the foundation for the integration of the supply 
chain1. Supply network with selected items of 
ABC method is presented in Figure 1.  
Very important from the point of view of 
maintaining a strong competitive position is to 
ensure an appropriate level of cost of acquisition of 
materials and services. Lack of alternative sources 
of obtaining materials or services results in                   
a stronger position of the supplier whose aim is, 
after all, to obtain the highest profit possible. It 
must therefore be assumed that these dependencies 
need to be affected by a higher level of costs. 
There is also the risk of dependence on customers 
and thus a situation in which the recipient has a 
much stronger position and may dictate adverse 
conditions for cooperation degrade the profitability 
of the business2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Determination of integration degree in the supply 
chain with use of the ABC method 
Source: Urbańczyk T., Rozwój sieci dostaw poprzez 
wdrażanie koncepcji łańcucha solidarności,                     
PhD Thesis, Poznań 2012, p. 96. 
 
AA relationships are the foundation for 
building a mutual integration of the supply chain. 
Therefore, efforts should be made to establish such 
a relationship. Relationships with suppliers  BA, 
CA, AB, BB, CB, AC, BC, CC should aim to 
select comprehensive suppliers to achieve 
integration AA. This means that the organization 
should strive to consolidate their purchases from           
                                                 
1 Urbańczyk T., Rozwój sieci dostaw poprzez wdrażanie 
koncepcji łańcucha solidarności, PhD Thesis, Poznań 
2012, pp. 95-96. 
2 Ibidem, p. 96. 
a single supplier in a given product range, and 
avoid an ad hoc purchases from multiple vendors3. 
 
3. COOPERATION GAMES 
In game theory, the games which are called 
cooperation games are those  in which all 
equilibrium of pure Nash strategy  are situations in 
which players choose the same or corresponding 
strategies. In other words, if the participants in                
a game can make binding commitments to 
coordinate their strategies, then the game is 
cooperative. The solution with coordinated 
strategies is a cooperative solution. Coalition is                 
a group of players who coordinate their strategies. 
An example of the coordination game is                    
a game in the direction of traffic. Both the solution 
to "all drive on the left side" and "all drive on the 
right side" is the Nash equilibrium, but none is 
better than another. However, in the real situation, 
only one of these strategies is finally chosen, by 
matching the (reconciliation, cooperation, 
coordination) between the players. 
The main issue will be the imputation of 
payments (value) between all members of the 
coalition. This imputation will be identified with 
the solution of the game. There are numbers of 
solution concepts for cooperative games. Two of 
them are important for this paper: the core and the 
Shapley value, where it must be considered as  
superadditive games, means such where the value 
of the sum of two disjoint coalition is not less than 
the sum of their values - the joint coalition is 
profitable. 
The core of a cooperative game consists of all 
imputations (if there are any) that are stable in the 
sense that there is no individual or group that can 
improve their payoffs (including side payments) by 
dropping out or reorganizing to form a new or 
separate coalition. Side payments occur when                
a part of the payoff is transferred from one member 
of a coalition to another, so that no member of the 
coalition needs to be worse off as a result of 
adopting the coordinated strategy of the coalition. 
Side payments will always be possible in a game 
with transferable utility (correlated with money 
payoffs) such as purchasing group problem4. 
The Shapley value is also applied for supper 
additive games in coalition function form, but 
within those limits it has the advantage of 
                                                 
3 Ibidem, p. 97. 
4 R.A. McCain, Game Theory – A Nontechnical 
Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy, World 
Scientific, p. 403-415. 
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uniqueness: there is always exactly one Shapley 
value. This value is based on a concept of                 
a marginal contribution5. Shapley presented the 
value as an operator that assigns an expected 
marginal contribution to each player in the game 
with respect to a uniform distribution over the set 
of all permutations on the set of players. 
Specifically, let π  be a permutation (or an order) 
on the set of players, in example, a one-to-one 
function from N onto N, and let us imagine the 
players appearing one by one to collect their payoff 
according to the order π . For each player i we can 
denote by { })()(: jijp ππ >=  the set of players 
preceding player i in the order π . The marginal 
contribution of player i with respect to that order 
π  is )()( ii pvipv ππ −∪ . If permutations are 
randomly chosen from the set π  of all 
permutations, with equal probability for each one 
of the n! permutations, then the average marginal 
contribution of player i in the game v is: 
 
[ ]∑
Π∈
−∪=
π
ππφ )()(!
1)( iii pvipvn
v , 
 
which is the Shapley definition of value6.   
Cooperative game theory focuses on what 
groups of players can achieve rather than what 
individuals can do. As a result, it typically assumes 
complete information. On the other hand, 
mechanism design in non-cooperative game theory 
aims to design a game that achieves the desired 
social outcome even when agents are self-
interested, strategic and have private information. 
Sometimes, the boundary between non-cooperative 
game theory and cooperative game theory is not 
always clearly cut (because non-cooperative game 
theory is sometimes also involved in cooperating)7. 
 
4. PURCHASING GROUPS IN 
COOPERATIVE LOT SIZING GAMES 
The functioning of the purchasing group based 
on the assumption of "a big can do more" is 
reasonable economies of scale of implementation 
several smaller contracts, which is the very 
                                                 
5 Ibidem, pp. 418-421. 
6 E. Winter, The Shapley value. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S 
(eds.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic 
Applications, vol. 3/2002, Elsevier, chap 53, p. 2028. 
7 L. Boongasame, Survey on Buyer Coalition 
Mechanisms, Applied Mathematical Sciences, Vol. 
7/2013, No 5, p. 232. 
purpose of its establishment. The use of purchasing 
group power (large one-time or recurring contract) 
is the basis for minimizing the costs associated 
with the distribution, especially with realization of 
one transportation orders set8. 
Consider a set of retailers N ={1;…;n} that sell 
the same item. They all have a known demand for 
a t-period model horizon. All retailers buy the 
items at the same manufacturer. When a retailer 
places an order, the manufacturer charges ordering 
cost and production cost, which is linear in the 
amount of items ordered. Furthermore, when                   
a retailer carries inventory from one period to the 
next period to satisfy future demand, holding costs 
are incurred. We assume that in a single period 
holding costs are equal for each retailer. Now                
a single retailer tries to minimize its total ordering, 
production and holding costs. Note that this is 
exactly the situation as in the Economic Lot Sizing 
(ELS) problem, where setup cost in the ELS 
problem corresponds to ordering cost in the ELS 
game. If a collection of retailers cooperates in the 
above setting, a cost saving may be obtained. 
Namely, instead of placing individual orders the 
retailers can place a joint order and save ordering 
costs9. 
We search for the ordering quantity tq  in                
a way that total cost are minimized. The total costs 
consist of holding costs htc per stored item, fixed 
ordering costs stc (incurs whenever an order is 
placed in period t) and unit ordering costs ptc . 
Depending on the order quantities and the demand, 
there are tI  units of the item on stock at the end of 
period t. Formally, each player Ni∈ has a demand 
itd  that should be met in period t. If all players of 
set N cooperate they face a join demand. An order 
in period t is placed when 1=tx , 0 otherwise. The 
problem to be solved can be couched as10: 
 
                                                 
8 K. Nowicka, Grupy zakupowe, czyli duży może 
więcej. „Gospodarka Materiałowa i Logistyka” 2009,  
no 5, p. 10. 
9 W. Heuvel, P. Borm, H. Hamers, Economic Lot-Sizing 
Games (17 2004, 11), p. 6. ERIM Report Series 
Reference No. ERS-2004-088-LIS. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636804. 
10 J. Drechsel, Cooperative Lot Sizing Games in Supply 
Chains, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg 2010,                
p. 63-65. 
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)(Nc represents the total costs for ordering 
jointly in the grand coalition N. By construction, 
total costs for an arbitrary coalition S are positive             
( 0)( ≥Sc for all NS ⊆ ) and total costs for an 
empty coalition equal 0 ( 0)0( =c )11. 
The question arises how to allocate the total 
costs to the single members of the coalition. From 
a theoretical perspective, allocation rules are often 
tested based on the number of attractive properties 
they satisfy from a fairly standard list of 
requirements. This list includes several reasonable 
properties such as symmetry, efficiency, additivity, 
individual rationality, etc. Of the many popular 
allocation rules from theory, such as the Shapley 
value, the nucleolus and the compromise value, the 
Shapley value turns out to be the most attractive 
for the savings game. Moreover, recall that we 
assumed p(q) is a convex function and qp(q) is 
concave and increasing in q. This seems to be               
a reasonable assumption that holds for most 
schedules in practice. In particular, the total 
payments made to the seller, as one would expect, 
increases as the quantity purchased becomes 
larger, and this increase sees a diminishing return. 
When this property is factored in, the savings game 
turns out to be convex. Convexity implies the 
super-additivity of the game; that is, when any two 
disjunctive coalitions join, the total savings 
generated by their members increase. A direct 
implication of this fact is that the Shapley value 
satisfies a myopic stability property (in example 
the Shapley value belongs to the core when the 
game is convex, and no subset of players wants to 
defect from N). The Shapley value with stands 
                                                 
11 Ibidem, p. 65. 
commonly used tests of fairness and equity. 
Moreover, common problems associated with 
purchasing groups, such as monotonicity of payoff 
with respect to contribution and weak free rider 
issues, are minimal when the Shapley value is 
used. Further, the nucleolus and compromise value 
do not yield the grand coalition in the farsighted 
sense, are less intuitive, and therefore harder to 
implement in practice. The Shapley value also has 
the advantage that it has robust approximations, 
which is convenient for practical applications12. 
 
5. APPLICATIONS 
Game theory has become a common tool in 
defining the relationship between firms in the 
supply chain. Presented in this article the issue of 
optimizing and sharing of benefits arising from the 
functioning the purchasing group in the supply 
chain is one of many possibilities that it carries. 
Concepts of searching for the optimal solution in 
the core game and the profit-sharing from Shapley 
value will apply in simple situations, where access 
to information is good (in theory unlimited) and 
market situation uncomplicated. For more complex 
situations an extended operation algorithms such as 
Multi-level Lot Sizing13 or an Inverse Economic 
Lot Sizing Approach14 would be beneficial. 
If purchasing group finds the imputation as 
fair, relationships in the supply chain will foster 
further trade and power of the leader will be less. 
In other words, the chain is closer to the relational 
situations AA, which will follow with the 
construction of a chain of solidarity. 
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